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BOT CONTRACTS 
Deborah R. Gerhardt & David Thaw* 
In this Article, we explain why the transactions commonly known as “smart 
contracts” are better understood as “bot contracts.” Taking an interdisciplinary 
approach, we show why the “smart contracts” moniker is misdescriptive in two 
important ways. First, these transactions are automated, not smart. Second, they do 
not afford parties many enforcement rights and defenses that one expects from 
common law contractual relationships. To fully understand these transactions, it is 
important to appreciate how the term “smart contracts” differs from what the 
technology delivers.  
 
Our review of the technology explains that these transactions have tremendous 
practical utility in reducing risk and avoiding the uncertainty and expense of seeking 
judicial enforcement. However, the electronic processes that occur in this category 
are not smart in the sense of being thoughtful, creative, or even amenable to change. 
They are programmed to follow preset instructions and execute automatically. Once 
the conditions for performance under a smart contract occur, performance cannot 
be stopped. Because these transactions are automated, they lack features and 
defenses available to those who enter into typical contractual relationships. 
Common law contracts are sets of promises or obligations that may be enforced by 
a court. However, once a smart contract is set in motion, no person or court can 
reverse the transaction. In this way, smart contracts differ fundamentally from 
traditional contracts because they leave no room for judicial intervention. By 
design, they evade the risk of what a court may do in fashioning a remedy. Courts 
have no power to set the transaction aside if it was induced by fraud or if another 
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common law defense would, under other circumstances, render the transaction void 
or voidable. Although the term “smart contract” appears to have taken hold, we 
propose that these transactions are better thought of as “bot” or “automated” 
agreements. Reframing these transactions in this way would reset expectations in 
line with what the technology can deliver. Adopting this more encompassing 
terminology will send a strong informational signal that avoids misrepresenting the 
abilities of these agreements by more accurately communicating that they execute 
automatically and eliminate both the risks and benefits that accompany traditional 
common law contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term “smart contracts” seems to have taken on a life of its own. The 
moniker was coined by a computer scientist to describe software that worked like a 
vending machine.1 In the following decades, its meaning has snowballed to the point 
where the term has picked up power and meaning that extends beyond what the 
technology offers. To understand these transactions, one must consider how smart 
contracts differ from common law contracts. 
Smart contracts occur when two people tell software to conduct an activity. 
Unlike a traditional common law contract, in which offer and acceptance of mutual 
promises occur, entering into a smart contract is like standing with a friend and 
agreeing to press the button that unlocks your car doors. Once you both press the 
button, there is no turning back. The software sends a signal. The car will unlock. 
Pressing the button again can cause the car to lock, but it will not change the first 
unlocking. Smart contracts work in the same way. Two people may decide to 
complete a sale if a certain condition (analogous to pressing the lock button) occurs, 
 
 1. Roberto Pardolesi & Antonio Davola, What Is Wrong in the Debate About 
Smart Contracts 1 (Feb. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339421. 
2020] BOT CONTRACTS 879 
the instructions are sent, and the transaction will perform. Once the triggering 
conduction happens, formation of the contract cannot be stopped or undone. For this 
reason, the term “smart contracts” is technically misdescriptive in two ways. The 
electronic processes that fit in this category are not smart. They do not think, create, 
or choose. Rather, they are programmed, not to think, but to follow preset 
instructions. And strictly speaking, they are not contracts. Common law contracts 
are sets of promises or obligations that may be enforced at law. Once a smart contract 
is set in motion, no person or court can reverse the transaction. Like electronic door 
locks, smart contracts can add tremendous value and efficiency by minimizing 
effort, error, and risk.2 
In this Article, we illustrate how these automated transactions challenge the 
foundational notions of contract law and have important implications for parties 
considering what type of platform to select for their transactions. Part I identifies 
basic features that separate enforceable contracts from other promises. Part II 
summarizes the technology that enables private actors to enter smart contracts. Once 
that foundation is set, it becomes clear that smart contracts lack several features of 
common law contracts. These features are identified in Part III. Most notably, smart 
contracts leave no room for judicial intervention. By design, they eliminate the 
uncertainty of what a court may do in fashioning a remedy. They are, therefore, not 
the kinds of transactions for which a court can provide a remedy or order the parties 
to do anything. Courts have no power to set the transaction aside if it is based on 
fraud or if a common law defense would, under other circumstances, provide a 
reason to void the transaction. For all of these reasons, the agreements known as 
“smart contracts” offer a mix of benefits and challenges which are obscured by their 
common name. Although the term “smart contract” appears to have taken hold, we 
suggest that these transactions are better thought of as “bot” or “automated” 
contracts because of the many ways they differ from traditional contracts that come 
with a host of common law remedies and a set of expectations that automated 
transactions are designed not to provide. 
I. DEFINING FEATURES OF COMMON LAW CONTRACTS 
A basic tenet of contract law is that only a subset of mutual decisions and 
exchanged promises amount to enforceable contracts.3 The law of contracts defines 
these boundaries.4 Contracts that are bargained exchanges between adult actors with 
the capacity to enter into agreements are protected by contract law.5 Although they 
are private agreements, they emanate an aura of authority arising out of the accepted 
notion that courts will enforce them. Not all promises fall within this boundary. The 
 
 2. Smart contracts purport to bring together the advantages of a self-executing 
contract with the customization options of traditional common law contractual drafting. 
Furthermore, they reduce resolution costs by largely removing enforcement from the 
equation. However, as this Article addresses, these advantages are not always present and not 
all smart contracts deliver on the full promises of traditional common law contracts. 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A 
contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or 
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
 4. See generally id. 
 5. See id. § 12. 
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possibility of court intervention to identify and enforce an agreement is an important 
element in defining this boundary between enforceable contracts and unenforceable 
promises or agreements. Professor Joseph Perillo begins his contracts treatise with 
a discussion on the difficulty of defining a contract.6 But all the competing 
definitions share a common theme. They embrace the understanding that “[e]very 
contract involves at least one commitment that has legal consequences.”7 In its very 
first section, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts uses this notion in defining a 
contract. The Restatement provides that “[a] contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”8 The Uniform Commercial Code 
confirms this basic foundation, noting that even if an agreement is missing a key 
term, it still may be considered a contract if “there is a reasonably certain basis for 
giving an appropriate remedy.”9 In other words, an agreement will be deemed a 
contract only if, by its terms, a neutral arbiter can identify and award a remedy. 
The common law tradition developed the requirement that a set of promises 
rises to the level of a contract only if a court can enforce it. For example, if a set of 
promises is not sufficiently definite for a court to intervene and provide a remedy, it 
will not be deemed an enforceable contract. Professor Samuel Williston explains 
that “[i]t is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must 
be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give it an exact meaning.”10 State 
courts similarly rely on the possibility of judicial enforcement as a metric for 
determining whether a contract exists. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court 
opined that “any contract must express all terms essential to the transaction with 
definiteness sufficient to enable a court to enforce the parties’ agreement.”11 A 
court’s ability to identify contractual obligations and fashion a remedy is essential 
to determining whether expressions and conduct fit within the sets of promises the 
law recognizes as contracts. 
This basic existential notion is not unique to the United States. The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods indicates that it is not 
intended to address whether an agreement constitutes a valid contract.12 
 
 6. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 1 (7th 
ed. 2014) (“No entirely satisfactory definition of the term ‘contract’ has ever been devised. 
The difficulty of definition arises from the diversity of the expressions of assent which may 
properly be denominated ‘contracts’ and from the various perspectives from which their 
formation and consequences may be viewed.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 9. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977) (“Even though 
one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy.”). 
 10. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:21, at 634 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007). 
 11. Capmark Bank v. RGR, LLC, 81 So. 3d 1258, 1268 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Macon Cty. Greyhound Park v. Knowles, 39 So. 3d 100, 108 (Ala. 2009)). 
 12. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
art. 4(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (“This Convention governs only the formation of 
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Accordingly, the entire convention is premised on the notion that one or more 
tribunals may enforce agreements within its scope.13 
II. HOW SMART CONTRACTS WORK 
Evaluating the ability of smart contracts to implement the requirements of 
common law contract doctrine first requires some basic understanding of blockchain 
technologies, their history, and the development of the technologies currently 
referred to as “smart contracts.” This is particularly important because we are 
considering an emerging technology, the limitations (and abilities) of which 
continue to evolve over time. This Part begins with some “Blockchain Basics,” 
followed by a contextual overview of the history of blockchain technologies and the 
rise of smart contracts. It concludes by contextualizing the current abilities of smart 
contracts to fulfill contract doctrinal requirements. In particular, we focus on two 
apparent deficiencies: the implied right of parties to breach and the legal requirement 
of capacity. 
A. Blockchain Basics 
The technologies we collectively refer to as “blockchain” are a system for: 
(1) distributing work; and (2) coordinating that work across many computers 
connected by a network (usually the public Internet). This structure enables the 
coordination of distributed work without the need for a single centralized authority. 
Since this process heavily involves “verifying work” and need not necessarily use a 
“chain” style data structure,14 we refer to these technologies collectively as 
“Distributed Verification Technologies” (“DVTs”).15 This Section gives a brief 
 
the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such 
a contract. In particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not 
concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.”). 
 13. See Jarno Vanto, Attorneys’ Fees As Damages in International Commercial 
Litigation, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 203, 218 (2003) (“[T]he preamble to the Convention 
provides: ‘Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for 
the international sale of goods and taking into account the different social, economic and legal 
systems . . . .’ This means that, at least on a symbolic level, the Convention takes into account 
different legal systems and consequently also the different outcomes they may produce.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 14. The data stored in a “blockchain” is an ordinal list of data points. See SATOSHI 
NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 2 (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. More advanced data structures, such as variations on binary 
tree structures, can be expressed mathematically as combinations of linked lists. Accordingly, 
any data that can be expressed in a data structure of an abstract “list” type can therefore be 
expressed in a data structure of an abstract “tree” type. Similar analysis can be applied to 
other structures, such as matrices. See generally THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION 
TO ALGORITHMS, chs. 3, 5–6, 10 (3d ed. 2009). 
 15. “Distributed Verification Technologies” is both more accurate and more 
usefully descriptive than the common business term “Distributed Ledger Technologies” for 
two reasons. First, the concept of a “ledger” implies a linked-list style data structure, which 
in addition to being only the prototype version of blockchain implementations, is also a 
comparatively highly inefficient data structure and thus is unlikely to be dominant (if even 
used) in the long-term. Second, the term “ledger” fails to capture the key element that 
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overview of “Blockchain Basics,” and the following Section provides greater detail 
on the history and implementation of blockchain-based technology known as “smart 
contracts.” 
Such “peer-to-peer”16 coordination is what enables the concept of 
“electronic cash” as bearer instruments—by arbitrarily distributing the verification 
of whether or not a particular cryptographic “token” properly belongs in a given 
“wallet.” These “consensus” mechanism, blockchain-based cryptocurrencies allow 
those cryptographic tokens to become effective bearer instruments because no 
“owner” or “recipient” of a given token must depend on any specific or centralized 
party to confirm the validity of their “instrument” (token), but rather can look to the 
net product of the peer-to-peer system for such confirmation. 
The peer-to-peer system, or consensus mechanism, can be implemented in 
a variety of different ways. Generally speaking, it comprises a data structure and an 
algorithm for community verification of modifications to the information stored in 
that data structure. In the context of most commonly used cryptocurrencies in 2020, 
the data structure usually comprises a singly linked list or public “ledger” of 
transaction history. Likewise, current blockchain implementations generally use a 
consensus algorithm that ensures a certain percentage of total “nodes” 
(computational participants17) in the network “agree” that a change should take place 
and ensures the accuracy of the ledger.18 The threshold required for verification of 
an ownership transfer generally is sufficiently high that the cost of a “takeover” 
 
facilitates distributed work—the verification process—and thus, we recommend that DVT is 
a superior term to describe this class of emerging technologies. See generally Usha R. 
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 697 (2019) (“Blockchain 
technology, also called distributed ledger technology (‘DLT’), offers four primary and related 
benefits: it is decentralized, it is transparent, it is (or at least can be) anonymous, and it is 
nearly impossible to manipulate.”); GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAUCHS, CAMBRIDGE CTR. 
FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN BENCHMARKING STUDY 24 (2017), 
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/alternative-finance/publications/global-
blockchain/#.X0f4EdNKhQI (“In general, the term ‘distributed ledger technology’ refers to 
all initiatives and projects that are building systems to enable the shared control over the 
evolution of data without a central party, with individual systems referred to as ‘distributed 
ledgers.’ If one wants to describe a system that has global data diffusion and/or uses a data 
structure of chained blocks, one should call it a ‘blockchain.’ However, ‘blockchain 
technology’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ are still commonly used interchangeably 
despite attempts to semantically separate them by their different underlying architectures.”). 
 16. The term “peer-to-peer” is a slight misnomer in this context in the sense that 
most current implementations of blockchain technologies implement tiered peering systems, 
rather than true fully peer-to-peer systems. However, for the purposes of this Article’s 
audience, the term is usefully descriptive. 
 17. Often (but not always) individual “general purpose computers” or PCs, depend 
on the particular blockchain implementation. In certain blockchains, such as the well-known 
Bitcoin blockchain, the nature of the computations involved lend themselves to Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (“ASICs”), and thus, the “nodes” in that regard may comprise 
highly specialized hardware instead of desktop or laptop PCs or servers running software as 
a background process. 
 18. See generally Sarwar Sayeed & Hector Marco-Gisbert, Assessing Blockchain 
Consensus and Security Mechanisms Against the 51% Attack, APPLIED SCIS., Apr. 2019. 
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attack,19 or inserting enough nodes to force an unauthorized transfer, will exceed the 
benefit of the value that can be obtained from the unauthorized transactions executed 
as a function of the “takeover.” 20 
Thus, the key basic concept of blockchain technology is not necessarily so 
much about currency as it is about verification. This concept of distributed 
verification, of course, is a natural model for financial transactions like payments. 
This model has extensions far beyond mere currency exchanges21 and, as this Article 
explores, may be a substitute for traditional common law contract dispute resolution. 
B. Brief History of Blockchain Technology 
The concept of blockchain was first proposed in a 2008 paper titled Bitcoin: 
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System and published under the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto.22 The paper proposed a solution for authenticating digital transactions 
without the need for a centralized authority. It articulated a series of proofs for a 
cash-like electronic commerce system that could be maintained by an arbitrarily 
distributed network with no centralized verification.23 These proofs showed that a 
distributed verification algorithm, or “consensus” mechanism, could prevent the 
double spending of digital assets. The “double spend problem” occurs when digital 
tokens—which can be copied flawlessly—are used to represent value. Because such 
tokens can be copied flawlessly, any given token, i.e., any digital monetary 
instrument, could be used twice or more, and the payee would have no mechanism 
of determining which was the original. The consensus mechanism distributes the 
verification of payments across many different computers, forming a so-called 
“digital ledger” that verifies the authenticity and provenance of payments before 
 
 19. This bears some conceptual similarity to a hostile takeover in the sense that at 
least some majority control will usually be required to execute the attack. However, given the 
fact that only a currency acquisition (as opposed to productive assets of a company) can be 
acquired, such an attack would at best only be a speculative investment in the cryptocurrency 
context and one that is extremely unlikely to be profitable since the market almost certainly 
would rapidly devalue a cryptocurrency compromised in that fashion. 
 20. See JOSHUA A. KROLL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF BITCOIN MINING, OR BITCOIN 
IN THE PRESENCE OF ADVERSARIES 12 (2013), 
https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf 
(“As a cartel must outmine the entire Bitcoin network and thus outspend the entire Bitcoin 
network for as long as it would remain a cartel, we believe it is very unlikely that a cartel 
could double-spend enough to recover the cost of the attack.”). But cf. Sayeed & Marco-
Gisbert, supra note 18, at 9 (assessing this probability differently and stating that “majority 
hash attacks have been a serious problem in recent times”). The Authors disagree with that 
assessment in that Sayeed and Marco-Gisbert’s analysis is context-dependent on specific 
market conditions, rather than inherent to the scientific design, and thus seems unlikely to 
apply to the general case. Kroll et al.’s analysis is more consistent with the Authors’ analysis. 
See KROLL ET AL., supra. 
 21. See generally DAVID THAW & WILL KANG, OBNOSTIC: AN OBJECT-AGNOSTIC 
“GENERAL PURPOSE BLOCKCHAIN” (2019), https://47b16f07-4bfb-43f2-9be9-
5c47db516f53.filesusr.com/ugd/b86d62_2da0ae7bb43d40a08ca0e7b2926a1647.pdf; U.S. 
Provisional Utility Patent Application No. 62/792,381 (filed Jan. 15, 2019). 
 22. NAKAMOTO, supra note 14. 
 23. Id. 
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settlement, and thereby prevents “double spending.”24 Nakamoto’s paper called the 
hypothetical system Bitcoin. The Bitcoin system prototype was deployed worldwide 
soon after the paper’s publication25 and gave rise to the name of the asset currently 
traded worldwide under the symbol “BTC.”26 The Bitcoin system prototype was 
deployed worldwide soon thereafter.  
Nakamoto’s paper and subsequent implementation of the first Bitcoin 
prototype in 2009 became the foundation of the blockchain concept. Together the 
paper and implementation proved the viability of DVTs (more commonly referred 
to as “Distributed Ledger Technologies”).27 More concisely, DVTs are distributed 
networks for maintaining consensus about data and making decisions regarding 
operations. They distribute computational work to maintain agreement about the 
answers to a set of questions without the need for intervention or verification by a 
centralized authority. 
Some background and history on the concept of blockchain (or DVTs) will 
be instructive to help contextualize the examples in which we apply common law 
contract doctrine to current implementations of smart contracts. 
1. The DVT Concept and the Development of Blockchain 
Much of blockchain’s success is attributed to its distributed nature, 
specifically the ability to maintain “trust” in the origin and ownership of digital 
objects without the need to rely on a centralized authority.28 This concept of 
distributed verification, or “consensus,” is the core of the blockchain concept. It 
comprises two essential elements: (1) a distributed data structure to maintain 
information;29 and (2) a consensus mechanism (algorithm) to govern and prove the 
authenticity of work performed by nodes participating in the distributed network.30 
The distributed data structure allows the DVT to work across many computers 
around the world without needing any one single computer or “central authority” to 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Eric D. Chason, How Bitcoin Functions as Property Law, 49 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 129, 131 (2018) (“Barely two months [after Nakamoto’s paper was published], in early 
January 2009, Bitcoin ‘went live’ with the creation of the first units of Bitcoin.”). 
 26. Id. at 132–33. 
 27. “Distributed Ledger Technologies” (“DLTs”) is, by far, a more commonly 
accepted term for the group of technologies used in cryptocurrencies and smart contract 
platforms. Although not the primary subject of this Article, we note that this term is 
technologically limiting in that it only contemplates globally maintained ledgers, as opposed 
to the larger category of efforts enabled by this technology—the ability to make coordinated 
decisions without the need for a firm or other centralized authority. In this context, 
“Distributed Verification Technologies” is a much more usefully descriptive term, and also 
better identifies why future technologies may have more ability to implement the guarantees 
of common law contracts. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 28. See generally SHAWN S. AMUIAL ET AL., THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GUIDE FOR 
LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS § 1:2 (2016). 
 29. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 3. 
 30. See id. at 4, 8. 
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coordinate the participants.31 The system enables the participants to maintain 
“consensus,” a term which represents the algorithmic process by which the 
computers participating in a given blockchain reach “agreement” regarding a 
specific data point, e.g., whether or not a transaction occurred or who owns a 
particular portion of a given Bitcoin.32 
A DVT is capable of maintaining consensus regarding data without an 
agreed upon common authority. DVTs thus can enable collective “answering of 
questions” and maintenance of data records. DVTs also provide the data structure 
which stores (or links to) the data they authenticate.33 The combination of these two 
items together—a distributed verification network and a distributed data structure—
forms the DVT itself. 
a. “Blockchain 1.0”: Static Digital Tokens 
The Bitcoin blockchain was the first example of a DVT. It encapsulates the 
idea of the “Blockchain 1.0” concept—a distributed verification of static tokens. The 
Bitcoin tokens (“BTCs”) are, quite literally, static cryptographic tokens which can 
be exchanged among “owners” via a provably hard34 public key cryptographic 
system. The public–private keypair cryptographic system prevents unauthorized 
transfers, and the Bitcoin network (the DVT) maintains a “ledger” of all Bitcoin 
transactions since the network’s inception, preventing duplication of the tokens.35 
 
 31. The coordination function, rather, is distributed across the entire network. 
Interestingly, this structure parallels work on the Theory of the Firm in economics, and some 
scholars have suggested that a similar concept can be used to create decentralized 
organizations, sometimes referred to as Distributed Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”). 
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 337 (2017) (“If 
a corporation is simply a nexus of contracts, why not encode those agreements into digital 
self-enforcing agreements? A DAO could have stock ownership, corporate governance rules, 
payroll arrangements, and virtually all of the economic trappings of a modern corporation, all 
running automatically in a completely distributed manner.”). 
 32. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 8. 
 33. See id. at 5. 
 34. “Provably hard” is a term of art in computer science and related fields which 
refers to the computational complexity, or “difficulty,” of solving a certain type of problem. 
It generally refers to the time it takes to solve such a problem through “brute force” guessing, 
expressed as a function of the number of guesses required to find a working solution. Since, 
technically speaking, a brute force mechanism has equal probability of being successful on 
the first try (a trivially short period of time) or on the last possible try (an extremely unlikely 
result), mathematical equations are instead used to express the “average case.” This concept 
of an “average case,” i.e., average time to guess, focuses not on a specific amount, but rather 
the degree of difficulty of the equation which models the “average” number of guesses. The 
result divides difficulty into categories, such as “constant time,” “linear time,” “polynomial 
time,” “exponential time,” “factorial time,” and so on. With classical (non-quantum) 
computers, problems that require more than polynomial time to brute force generally are 
considered to be “hard” because the combined computational power of all computers on earth 
is insufficient to solve such problems in reasonable time (less than millennia) by brute force 
guessing. This is a critical distinction because—much like the function of modern 
encryption—it is the mechanism by which computers “prevent” unauthorized changes or 
access in systems which must share data publicly, such as cryptocurrencies and other 
blockchain-style DVTs. See generally CORMEN ET AL., supra note 14. 
 35. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 2. 
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The result is a first-generation form of digital private property—static tokens which 
can be “owned” and “possessed” like tangible property in the real world. 
These concepts of ownership and possession, without the need for 
mediation or approval by a centralized authority, have been cited by many observers 
as key drivers of the popularity of cryptocurrencies.36 Both privacy concerns and 
cybersecurity concerns are among those driving cryptocurrency popularity.37 
Among individuals who distrust centralized currency and payment systems based 
on fiat currencies—whether for legitimate38 or illegitimate39 reasons—the 
decentralized, distributed nature of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies is very 
attractive. From a security standpoint, individuals concerned with the vulnerabilities 
of centralized single-point-of-failure systems for electronic payments40 or with the 
stabilities of fiat currencies41 may find the decentralized aspects of cryptocurrencies 
 
 36. See, e.g., Jorge Galavis, Blame It on the Blockchain: Cryptocurrencies Boom 
Amidst Global Regulations, 26 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 561, 564 (2019) (“[T]he 
underregulated market is likely the reason for the booming popularity of ICOs 
and Cryptocurrencies in general.”); Alice Huang, Reaching Within Silk Road: The Need for a 
New Subpoena Power that Targets Illegal Bitcoin Transactions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2093, 2101–
02 (2015) (“Due to Bitcoin’s growing popularity and its advantages over traditional payment 
methods, many businesses have begun accepting the virtual currency. One crucial 
advantage is the payment freedom that Bitcoin provides. Transactions are instantaneous and 
borderless; unlike banks, which restrict users by business hours, holidays, and transfer limits, 
Bitcoin does not impose any limitations on the time, place, or amount of its transactions. 
Furthermore, Bitcoin has very low transaction fees and sellers have the ability to bypass the 
usual cost of accepting a credit card payment.” (citations omitted)). 
 37. See Huang, supra note 36, at 2103 (“One of the main reasons Bitcoin has 
become popular is the near anonymity it offers. Users are virtually anonymous because its 
public key encryptions only reference the locations of bitcoins without disclosing any other 
information about the user. In this sense, Bitcoin is analogous to cash. Each transaction is 
neatly recorded but it becomes difficult for government officials to identify the individuals 
behind the transactions.” (citations omitted)). 
 38. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Turpin, Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, 
Virtual Currency Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 335, 360 (2014) (“Additionally, dissidents in oppressive countries may find Bitcoin to 
be a preferred method of payment for their opposition activities. For example, an anti-
government blogger in China must take great care to avoid being identified by the highly 
skilled Internet police.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Carmine DiPiero, Deciphering Cryptocurrency: Shining a Light on 
the Deep Dark Web, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2017) (“‘Silk Road’ was one of the 
first ‘Darknet markets’ to emerge on the Internet since the invention of the bitcoin. 
Throughout 2011 and 2013, users of the Silk Road website could buy anything—drugs, child 
pornography, arranged murders, hacked credit cards, and countless other illicit activities and 
substances—using a virtual currency known as ‘bitcoin.’”). 
 40. See, e.g., Emily Flitter & Karen Weise, Capital One Data Breach 
Compromises Data of Over 100 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach-hacked.html. 
 41. See, e.g., Swati Goyal, The Difference Between Fiat Money and 
Cryptocurrencies, YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/difference-
between-fiat-money-cryptocurrencies-132027811.html (“[Fiat] currencies are always at risk 
of becoming worthless due to hyperinflation as they are not linked to any physical reserves 
such as commodities.”). 
2020] BOT CONTRACTS 887 
equally attractive. In both cases, cryptocurrencies are acting like tangible property 
and performing an economic function largely suppressed by the digitization of 
society—the ability to engage in payment-based transactions without having to 
reveal one’s identity or create a permanent record of the transaction associated with 
an individual.42 Historically, anonymity was accomplished through “cash” 
transactions (or “cash equivalents” like diamonds, in the case of those who distrust 
central currencies) because of the bearer-instrument-like nature of such currencies 
or commodities. The absence of bearer-instrument-like property rights in the digital 
economy had previously prevented individuals from transacting anonymously via 
Internet-based commerce. The (re)introduction of these rights through 
cryptocurrencies restored such transaction capacity. 
DVTs thus create a class of potential rights in digital objects similar to that 
applicable to tangible property under classic common law property doctrine.43 
Because the information contained within the tokens need not necessarily represent 
a currency object, the potential for enabling traditional property rights in other types 
of digital property44 follows logically from this analysis. We note these in the 
following portions of this Section addressing advances in DVTs and plan to address 
this concept further in future work. 
Ironically, Nakamoto did not reference the term blockchain anywhere in 
the paper and only described the concept of a “proof-of-work” algorithm.45 Lack of 
information regarding Nakamoto’s true identity currently precludes determining 
whether Nakamoto recognized the potential of Bitcoin as a broader concept or for 
that matter, whether Nakamoto has participated in any additional blockchain or DVT 
projects. 
 
 42. Whether identified or not, even “anonymous” online transactions may still 
create permanent records associated with a unique individual, even if that individual is not 
associated with a specific natural person. As privacy scholars have observed, 
(re)identification or deanonymization of such activities may subsequently lead to the 
association of those previously anonymous individual online personas with physical-world 
natural persons. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 13, 16 (2019) (“In actuality, identifying individuals using seemingly non-
unique identifiers is far easier than a data sanitizer might hope. . . . To be sure, it is difficult 
to pin down exactly what data identifies individuals, but it is even more difficult to accurately 
predict what potential auxiliary information could be available in the future—i.e., the de-
identification-re-identification arms race.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Doug Fredrick, Down the Rabbit Hole: Cryptocurrency & 
Blockchain, WIS. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 22, 28–29 (“The sequential nature of blockchain 
networks naturally lends itself to transactions such as recording documents that transfer 
ownership of real estate or vehicles, as well as maintaining medical records. Recorder or 
register of deeds’ offices are especially predisposed to implementation of blockchain 
technology, because a large part of what they do is maintain a public ledger, so it would be a 
relatively small step to digitize and automate the process of recording real estate documents 
and even marriage certificates.”). 
 44. E.g., electronic records (such as health or financial records), digital creative 
content, etc. 
 45. In fact, the word “consensus” appears only once in the paper’s conclusion. See 
NAKAMOTO, supra note 14. 
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Although the computational engine which operates the Bitcoin network 
does have (at least some) ability to perform arbitrary computation, to the extent that 
ability exists it is constrained as a matter of implementation.46 Practically speaking, 
therefore, Bitcoin and other “Blockchain 1.0” implementations generally can do 
little more than provide the tangible property rights described above for fixed, 
predefined (static) tokens. 
b. “Blockchain 2.0”: Executable Agreements (“Smart Contracts”) 
The next step in the evolution of DVTs was the ability to implement 
arbitrary computation, or the development of what computer science refers to as a 
“Turing-complete” virtual machine (“VM”).47 Such a VM was unnecessary for the 
limited-purpose DVT implementations of most static “Blockchain 1.0” tokens 
known as cryptocurrency.48 Because fixed-token cryptocurrency implementations 
had predetermined and (generally) permanently fixed computational models,49 the 
arbitrary applications supported by a full VM were unnecessary.50 
As these cryptocurrencies gained popularity in online commerce, however, 
the market increasingly sought methods to computationally enforce agreements 
surrounding the exchange of those tokens similar to how “Blockchain 1.0” 
cryptocurrencies computationally enforced ownership of tokens. A growing desire 
to automate certain cryptocurrency transactions based on various conditions being 
satisfied drove a need for more computational flexibility to implement apps which 
could accomplish this automation. For example, two parties might want to schedule 
a payment to occur on a monthly basis in exchange for a product or service, where 
 
 46. See CRAIG S. WRIGHT, BITCOIN: A TOTAL TURING MACHINE 243 (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265146. 
 47. See generally id. Arbitrary computation is the ability to perform any type of 
computational operation on a particular system—usually through an operating system which 
provides an interface to translate commands from a programming language into physical-
level instructions. Nonarbitrary computers, or ASICs are by contrast capable only of 
performing one specific type of operation. ASICs are popular as Bitcoin “miners” because 
they can be constructed to perform SHA-256 operations (the mining algorithm) much faster 
if the processor is built only to perform such calculations. A less restrictive but similar concept 
is found in Graphics Processing Units (“GPUs”) of many modern computer systems which 
have a dedicated “chip” (microprocessor) separate from the main processor (CPU) which is 
designed for and dedicated to graphics operations. 
 48. See AMUIAL ET AL., supra note 28, § 2:3 (“[S]mart contracts represent a 
significant advance over the basic scripting language that only maintains unspent transaction 
outputs on a distributed ledger (e.g., Bitcoin). While the Bitcoin protocol contains a basic 
scripting language that allows for some programming functionality, it is not nearly as robust 
as the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) that is incorporated into the Ethereum Protocol or 
similar protocols with Turing-complete programming capabilities.”). 
 49. See generally supra note 47 for a discussion of the concepts of arbitrary 
(general purpose) computing versus application-specific computing. “Fixed” computational 
models are those which can be designed for the latter category through the development of 
ASICs. 
 50. This is similar to the concept of the computation chip in a hand calculator 
versus that found in a laptop computer. The former performs a specific, predefined set of 
computations, whereas the latter is a “general purpose computer” that may need to run any 
number of arbitrary “apps” for the user. 
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the governing app would automatically transfer a specified amount of 
cryptocurrency from the buyer to the seller once the product or service was 
delivered. Essentially, the market wanted DVTs to implement self-executing 
agreements or contracts.51 
This demand led to the development of platforms like Ethereum to 
implement what became known as “smart contracts.” Ethereum is a DVT that 
implements a Turing-complete VM, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (“EVM”), 
capable of arbitrary computation. Ethereum allows users to build apps on a platform 
which combines token ownership with encodable agreements describing when and 
how ownership will change. Implementing this type of encodable agreement (e.g., 
smart contract) requires a programmatic language specifying terms and conditions 
under which a token-based transaction will take place. Thus, implementing smart 
contracts effectively requires arbitrary computation to allow a contracting language 
with sufficient flexibility. The “fixed computational” approach of Bitcoin or similar 
systems is insufficient for this goal. 
Ethereum represented a substantial advance forward in the development of 
DVTs. Parties to cryptocurrency transactions could encode the terms of those 
transactions in Solidity52 and have those terms become part of the Ethereum 
blockchain. The details of these terms would then be verifiable by the Ethereum 
consensus mechanism similar to how ownership of tokens is verifiable by 
“Blockchain 1.0” consensus mechanisms. These smart contracts could ensure that 
once specified computationally verifiable circumstances are satisfied, the terms of 
the agreement would be fulfilled and the associated cryptocurrency (i.e., ETH 
tokens) would be transferred. The effective result is a self-executing agreement. 
Such smart contracts, however, are generally immutable once accepted into 
the ETH blockchain and, as such, may not be able to grant the full spectrum of legal 
contract rights. Most notably, they are not subject to post-execution redress 
mechanisms which appear in law but not within the contract themselves. Put simply, 
the computational nature of smart contracts quite literally constrains any resolution 
of the agreement terms to the “four corners of the contract” (code) itself. 
Because the computational function of this verification is managed by the 
EVM, it is technically possible to create arbitrary programs which run on the 
 
 51. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 31, at 317 (“Firms can achieve significant 
cost savings and efficiency gains when using computers to automate contracting.”) (citing 
JAMES SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, PROFILES IN INNOVATION: BLOCKCHAIN (2016), 
https://pgcoin.tech/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/blockchain-paper.pdf (detailing different 
applications and cost-saving estimates of blockchain across several industries)). 
 52. See generally SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.0/ (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2020) (“Solidity is an object-oriented, high-level language for implementing smart 
contracts. Smart contracts are programs which govern the behaviour of accounts within the 
Ethereum state. Solidity was influenced by C++, Python and JavaScript and is designed to 
target the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Solidity is statically typed, supports inheritance, 
libraries and complex user-defined types among other features. With Solidity you can create 
contracts for uses such as voting, crowdfunding, blind auctions, and multi-signature 
wallets.”).  
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Ethereum network.53 This functionality was one of the goals of Ethereum’s founder, 
Vitalik Buterin, who initiated the project as an offshoot of Bitcoin after years of 
unsuccessfully arguing that Bitcoin needed a more general scripting language as part 
of its DVT platform.54 While Ethereum does technically implement this capability, 
it is limited by two critical design constraints. First, the EVM does not scale—it 
lacks the computational capacity to handle more complex distributed applications 
(“dApps”).55 As some blockchain developers have joked, “Ethereum runs scared at 
the sight of a baby kitten.”56 Second, the EVM is designed to implement contracts, 
and as such, the language is constructed with that purpose in mind. The result is 
reminiscent of Roman contract law—“you can build any dApp you want on 
Ethereum, as long as it is a dApp comprising Smart Contracts.”57 
An additional shortcoming of Ethereum—and other “Blockchain 2.0”—
based smart contracts is the need to rely on a concept known as “Oracles.” The 
limitations of the EVM restrict the information contained “on-chain,” or as part of 
the blockchain data structure itself, to that information which is encoded into the 
executable Solidity code and the ETH tokens themselves.58 In other words, a smart 
contract only “knows” the information contained within it when it is “written.” But 
what if the contract execution depends on some external information, such as 
completion of a project (as most contracts do)? In these cases, smart contracts must 
rely on a concept known as “Oracles”—external data sources programmed into the 
smart contract itself. These data sources can be virtually anything accessible from 
 
 53. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 31, at 333–34 (“Ethereum’s scripting 
language is significantly more powerful than Bitcoin’s. It is Turing complete, which means it 
can in theory execute any function that can be processed by a computer.”). 
 54. See VITALIK BUTERIN, ETHEREUM, A NEXT GENERATION SMART CONTRACT & 
DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM (2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0dbb/
8a54ca5066b82fa086bbf5db4c54b947719a.pdf?_ga=2.104118087.655109952.1597800835-
1475162564.1597800835. 
 55. Note that some within the community refer to “dApps” as decentralized 
applications. Regardless of which terminology one selects, the lack of scalability of the EVM 
remains. 
 56. This is a reference to the Cryptokitties app, a blockchain-based virtual game 
for the “growing,” trading, and “raising” of virtual cats. In December 2017, the dApp nearly 
brought the Ethereum network to a halt by overpowering the computational capacity of the 
network since the dApp’s complexity exceeded the computational power traditionally 
envisioned for smart contract evaluation and settlement. See CryptoKitties Craze Slows Down 
Transactions on Ethereum, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42237162. 
 57. Several scientists, business leaders, and legal scholars have noted that 
physical-world organizations are, in fact, just a collection of contractual relationships. Putting 
aside the elements of psychology and sociology dealing with the inherently non-deterministic 
nature of human behavior, this view—one often advocated by proponents of DAOs—ignores 
the inherently qualitative aspects of human decision-making, contractual evaluation, and 
organizational operation for any organization which comprises humans as well as contracts 
(which is, by definition, all physical-world organizations). 
 58. It is, of course, possible to create programs within the EVM that store 
additional data, but for the same reasons EVM has difficulty creating dApp—primarily 
scalability issues—EVM has difficulty storing large amounts of data. 
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the public Internet, but unlike other parts of the smart contract, the EVM cannot 
inherently verify the authenticity of any information provided by an Oracle.59 
The failure of “Blockchain 2.0” projects, most notably Ethereum, to realize 
the full potential of DVTs has sparked offshoot projects in an attempt to correct 
these two key limitations and implement additional features. Most notably, the 
EOS.IO project (“EOS”)—a multi-billion (U.S.) dollar organization—is attempting 
to build a true distributed computational platform with all the traditional aspects of 
a computer.60 If successful, this “Blockchain 2.5” project would represent a 
substantial step towards fully realizing the potential of DVTs. Such projects also 
represent opportunities to develop implementations of the other examples of 
common law property rights in digital objects alluded to earlier in this Section. EOS, 
for example, implements trading of computational resources such as general 
processing,61 graphics processing,62 and volatile memory.63 
C. Present Smart Contract Limitations 
Current implementations of smart contracts can accomplish many things 
which create meaningful economic value. They can reduce transaction costs for 
parties by permitting individuals to create “self-settling” agreements without the 
need for further performance solely for contract settlement purposes. They can 
reduce uncertainty by creating programmatic options which specify when and how 
settlement will occur without the need for third-party escrow.64 These and similar 
 
 59. See generally John R. Kosinski, Ethereum Oracle Contracts: Setup and 
Orientation, TOPTAL: DEVELOPERS, https://www.toptal.com/ethereum/ethereum-oracle-
contracts-tutorial-pt1 (last visited Aug. 27, 2020). Note also, as does Kosinski, that “[t]he 
smart contract space, being so new, changes quickly . . . [and] features that were new when 
this article was written may be deprecated or obsolete by the time you’re reading this.” Id. 
 60. See generally EOSIO, https://eos.io/why-eosio/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
 61. General purpose computational processing is that performed by integrated 
circuits colloquially known as CPUs, which are not considered to be application-specific and 
can perform arbitrary computation, but generally with less efficiency for a given application 
than would a “chip” designed specifically for a given application. 
 62. Graphics processing for the display of multimedia on various visual devices, 
e.g., screens, VR headsets, holography, etc., are an example of a more application-specific 
integrated circuits, known colloquially as GPUs, where the physical hardware is designed to 
perform a more limited set of computations—generally with much greater efficiency—than 
a CPU. 
 63. Volatile memory is a term-of-art referring to the “temporary” memory storage 
of a computing device. Historically the colloquial term for this was a computer’s random 
access memory (“RAM”), as distinguishable from the floppy disks, optical discs, or hard disks 
or a computer. The latter—collectively described as “non-volatile” forms of memory—were 
used for “long term” storage after a computer was powered down or reset. In modern practice, 
these distinctions have blurred as almost all forms of long-term storage now have the full 
random access capabilities of short-term volatile memory, and the physical hardware for both 
are similar, i.e., both use solid-state “chips” rather than magnetic or optical “discs.” 
 64. James Grimmelman, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 2 J.L. & 
INNOVATION 1, 20 (2019) (noting that “smart contracts” do not completely eliminate 
uncertainty because potential semantic changes can be both unexpected and devastating and 
that “[b]lockchain-based smart-contract programming languages don’t have continual 
linguistic drift; they have occasional earthquakes”). 
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features of “self-executing” agreements are all laudable, beneficial technological 
advances. We do not argue that these advances are immaterial or that they may not 
lead to further development.65 But the implications for parties using technologies in 
their current form must be evaluated in terms of the expectations of those parties. 
And the term “smart contract” may create an expectation or understanding of what 
a contract is and what it means to be smart. Current technology used to run smart 
contracts cannot meet those expectations. The following Part explains this 
disconnect. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF “SMART” CONTRACTING ARE BETTER 
UNDERSTOOD AS “BOT” CONTRACTING 
The limitations of current smart contract technology (“Blockchain 2.0”) 
have important implications for the application of common law contract doctrine to 
this relatively new type of automated agreement. The fixed nature of these 
transactions leads to two consequences that are belied by the “smart contracts” 
moniker. First, smart contracts are not actually contracts in the common law sense 
of the term because they eliminate the role of courts or other neutral arbiters to 
resolve any disputes that may arise. The nature of the technology literally prevents 
the parties’ ability to breach the contract. Therefore, current smart contract 
technology is not “smart” because unlike a traditional contract, it is inflexible and 
cannot account for subject matter and capacity requirements of common law 
contract doctrine. Statutory law and common law contracts doctrine have evolved 
to articulate numerous reasons why a contract may be void or voidable after 
execution, most of which cannot be accounted for by current smart contract 
technology. However, the automated features that make these transactions different 
from typical contracts are what give these transactions their biggest benefits. 
A. The Elimination of an Enforcement Authority 
Just as a doctrinal determination regarding the status of smart contracts is 
premature, we argue that the usage of this term also is premature. Our contention is 
that the moniker “smart contracts” may be taken to believe that courts can intervene 
in circumstances where, in fact, a court’s ability to award damages or enforce the 
agreement is not technologically feasible. The word “contract” may lead consumers 
to believe that common law contract defenses are available when in fact they are 
not. A better name for these transactions would be “bot contracts,” as “bot” connotes 
the fixed, Internet-based nature of these deals. Global usage of the term “smart 
contract” combined with the rate of technological change is likely to make adoption 
of a new generic category unsuccessful. Nonetheless, legal scholars, practitioners, 
and courts should understand the benefits and limitations of these technological tools 
to avoid the trap of assuming the term “smart contract” connotes capabilities these 
devices currently cannot deliver.66 
 
 65. Quite the contrary, as discussed in Part III, it seems more likely that current 
technologies will lead to future developments capable of implementing many, if not all, of 
the elements of common law contract doctrine. 
 66. This point is particularly salient given that smart contracts have emerged in 
commercial use most predominantly in civil law jurisdictions such as the Republic of Korea, 
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It is worth noting that the ability to enter into such automated contracts is 
fully defensible and consistent with freedom in contracting. For example, one might 
argue that a smart contract really is a choice by the parties to have a self-settling 
agreement that becomes instantly binding, similar to the acceptance of an offer on 
the floor of a stock exchange or the motion signaling a bid at an auction. While it is 
true that in both cases such actions do signal the formation of a presumptively self-
settling contract, in both contexts the settlement of that contract can be interrupted 
for proper causes such as fraud or duress. Thus, it is possible that the term “smart 
contract” would lead consumers to believe that these so-called “smart” agreements 
allow for similar interruption capabilities. However, this confusion would be 
avoided with the use of a generic term that more accurately reflects the limitations 
of these agreements that defy normal contracting expectations. 
For example, if a smart contract is used to implement an auction and the 
goods are discovered to be fraudulent before settlement, no authority will have the 
ability to intervene and prevent the contract from executing unless that ability is 
programmed into the executable code of the smart contract before it is committed to 
the blockchain. This is inconsistent with the law surrounding fraud, which enables 
courts to free litigants from obligations procured fraudulently before full 
performance has been completed.67 
One might also claim that the failure of a given smart contract to implement 
“safeguards” which allow for judicial intervention is a drafting defect that implies 
the parties have assumed the liability for such defects by electing to use this 
technology. Stated differently, the response might be that the parties have impliedly 
waived these defenses by using this transaction method, and if they do not want to 
do so in the future, they may clarify their desires by writing better code, just as courts 
often admonish litigants to memorialize their intent in clearly written contracts.68 
There is some merit to this argument, to the extent that (at least in common law 
jurisdictions) contract drafting has developed extensively, and smart contract coding 
is in its infancy. Indeed, contract drafting has developed so far that some have argued 
there is insufficient time for the average person to keep up with all the contracts to 
 
Japan, and Germany. While common law jurisdictions (most notably the United Kingdom) 
have expressed some interest in these areas, the United States and United Kingdom are 
remarkably behind the technological curve in the development and utilization of blockchain 
technologies. Given the contract doctrine differences present between common law and civil 
code jurisdictions, it is worth noting that the moniker “smart contracts” may have gained 
traction more easily in those nations because current technologies may be able to implement 
more of the doctrinal requirements of contracts under local law in civil code jurisdictions than 
in common law jurisdictions. 
 67. For the purposes of this argument, we assume fraud defenses to be 
nonwaivable. We recognize that this is not necessarily the case in all circumstances, but the 
prevalence of nonwaivable fraud protections in a majority of common law and civil code 
jurisdictions makes those edge cases relatively immaterial to this argument. 
 68. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Common 
sense tells us that agreements should routinely be put in writing. This simple practice prevents 
misunderstandings by spelling out the terms of a deal in black and white, forces parties to 
clarify their thinking and consider problems that could potentially arise, and encourages them 
to take their promises seriously because it’s harder to backtrack on a written contract than on 
an oral one.”). 
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which they are subject.69 The use of smart contracts with standardized code (which 
could easily be evaluated for its “standard terms” at low cost to a user) could 
represent substantial transaction cost reduction in this context, particularly in 
industries where standard commercial terms are common to many or most 
transactions. 
The “write better code” argument has its limits, however. Standard default 
rules can add efficiency. Statutory and common law contain many default provisions 
that can be imported by courts as gap-fillers and therefore eliminate the necessity of 
spelling out every conceivable term. As discussed above, one need not claim the 
right of fraud protection in advance to enjoy such protection, and indeed in most 
cases this protection is nonwaivable. A similar analysis would apply to other void-
for-public-policy defenses and to duress defenses. Furthermore, code is 
deterministic,70 and current technological limitations preclude intervention by the 
courts based on qualitative examination of an unpredictable condition. Therefore, 
the “write better code” argument fails in circumstances where the transaction has 
nondeterministic aspects to it, which may occur because the parties lack the ability 
under current technology to account for those aspects in the coding of their smart 
contract.71 The only solution would be to have a general “interrupt” in which either 
party could, upon the proper initiation of legal action, cause the smart contract not 
to resolve. However, such an approach is effectively no different than current written 
contracts and carries similarly high transaction costs. Thus, while this approach 
might mitigate some doctrinal concerns, it would do so at the cost of much of the 
practical benefits associated with bot contracts. 
Another common counterargument might be that the court’s ability to order 
money damages is not reduced. If something invalidates a contract before 
settlement, and the contract is self-settling, the court simply would order the 
transaction reversed, or if not practically feasible, it would order appropriate money 
damages in the form of a second transaction. This response is informative and 
recognizes important freedom of contract principles but fails to recognize fully the 
limits of existing smart contract technologies. The design of existing blockchains is 
such that generally speaking, it is impossible to physically compel payment in the 
absence of cooperation by a breaching party. If, for example, a breaching party is 
judgment proof (far from a wild hypothetical in the current cryptocurrency 
environment) and elects not to cooperate, the private-key cryptographic aspects of 
the blockchain will prohibit any effective compulsory financial enforcement. The 
options in this scenario may be vastly different from the array of remedies available 
to litigants who seek to enforce financial promises through judgments or arbitration 
awards based on fiat currencies. Traditional litigants often implicitly rely on a 
 
 69. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 565 (2009) (“We estimate that reading 
privacy policies carries costs in time of approximately 201 hours a year, worth about $3,534 
annually per American Internet user. Nationally, if Americans were to read online privacy 
policies word-for-word, we estimate the value of time lost as about $781 billion annually.”). 
 70. Loosely defined as “capable of being mathematically predicted in advance,” 
or alternatively stated, not subject to randomness. 
 71. See Edmund Schuster, Cloud Crypto Land 15–16 (London Sch. of Econ. Legal 
Stud., Working Paper No. 17/2019, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3476678. 
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financial transaction ecosystem where financial institutions, employers, and other 
participants are bound by regulatory and criminal law to enforce judicial orders and 
freeze or otherwise dispose of funds in satisfaction of a judgment collection order. 
Courts currently have no such ability to effect orders of this type in the smart 
contract context.72 
Finally, we note that the deterministic nature of current smart contract 
executable code may be generally unsuitable for agreements which involve 
substantial qualitative judgments, such as transactions in artistic objects, 
professional services, or architectural design. In such circumstances, not only would 
current smart contract technology be required to rely substantially on Oracles,73 but 
also the Oracle’s judgment would effectively become that of a binding arbiter. This 
is not to argue that the parties could not agree to this,74 but rather that the parties 
must understand that the role of the Oracle is transforming from the mere 
“informative” one most parties would likely expect (similar to the role of an 
appraiser in a real estate transaction) into the role of a binding arbiter which would 
largely deprive the parties of their rights to seek judicial redress. 
Many of these arguments and implications for smart contract users center 
around the disconnect between the current market impression of those technologies 
and the general market expectations of individual parties (at least in common law 
jurisdictions). We fully acknowledge that these may change. Our argument regards 
the current state of the market and that the term “Bot Contracts” more accurately 
describes the current state of technology and the types of expectations market 
participants should anticipate when using “Blockchain 2.0” agreements based on 
platforms such as Ethereum, EOS, NEO, and related projects. 
B. Smart Contracts Neutralize Legal Defenses 
Not only are smart contracts not smart, they also are wholly amoral. They 
will execute no matter what criminal, fraudulent, or extortionist acts may underlie 
their foundation. The enforceability of common law contracts depends on the notion 
that the agreement concerns subject matter that courts deem worthy of enforcing and 
that the actors have the capacity to perform. Without these two features, a contract 
 
 72. Of course, as discussed in Section III.B, future developments in technology 
could implement these features. Indeed, the Venezuelan government is attempting to do so. 
See, e.g., Darren Parkin, Venezuela’s President Orders Banks to Open Crypto Desks, EXPRESS 
(July 5, 2019), https://www.express.co.uk/finance/city/1149744/crypto-desks-banks-
venezuela-nicolas-maduro-crv. However, for parties currently considering using smart 
contract technologies, and for dApps developers considering building platforms based on 
existing technologies, these considerations should weigh heavily into determining the types 
of transactions they elect to support or use smart contracts for. 
 73. In the interest of full disclosure, the Authors note that David Thaw currently 
is involved with a research and development project oriented toward implementing an “on-
chain” solution for automating certain classes of qualitative evaluations of this nature. 
 74. Indeed, many courts have upheld binding arbitration clauses, even in the 
context of class actions (or waivers thereof). But see, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. 
Ct. 1407 (2019) (affirming district court order that compelled arbitration but dismissing class-
action arbitration claims against employer from approximately 1,300 employees whose tax 
information was obtained from employer by hacker who used information to file fraudulent 
tax returns). 
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may be deemed impermissible and therefore voidable at the option of one party or 
void as a matter of law. Particularly in the case of contracts that violate public policy, 
an affected party may have the option of voiding a contract, and in some 
circumstances, the law simply may render the contract void and therefore 
unenforceable. Both conditions are not currently possible under existing smart 
contract technology. 
Contracts may be void or voidable for a number of reasons. While these 
vary by jurisdiction and include a wide variety of options, those relevant to this 
analysis all share the common characteristic that they involve conditions not deemed 
illegitimate by an enforcing authority before execution and where a court may or 
must order the contract unenforceable after execution.75 Common examples include 
incapacity, duress, and violation of public policy. 
Coerced agreements, for example may be voided by the person who was 
under duress.76 Similarly, a party induced to enter an agreement by fraudulent 
misrepresentation “may instead elect to avoid the transaction and obtain 
restitution.”77 If the subject of the agreement is illegal78 or violates public policy, the 
common law provides courts with the authority to set these deals aside and choose 
not to recognize them as legally enforceable contracts.79 
Traditional contract doctrine requires that such transactions, once agreed 
upon, may be nullified by the courts.80 For example, if Deborah and David enter into 
a common law contract to transfer a fixed amount of bitcoin, a court could intervene 
for a host of reasons. If David offered Deborah bitcoin in exchange for committing 
a murder, a court will not enforce the contract regardless of the parties’ desires.81 If 
David were a child, he could elect to avoid the contract.82 If Deborah pointed a gun 
at David’s head to force the transfer, a court could nullify the pact.83 If David paid 
 
 75. Often times this is after execution but before settlement, however this is not 
always the case. Those circumstances which are post-execution/pre-settlement are most 
salient to this analysis, because those are precisely the types of circumstances which are most 
problematic for existing smart contract technologies to address. 
 76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174–175 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 77. PERILLO, supra note 6, § 9.13, at 307. 
 78. See, e.g., Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 80. PERILLO, supra note 6, § 9.13, at 307. 
 81. See id. § 22.1, at 762 (“A contract guarantying performance of an illegal act is 
itself illegal.” (citations omitted)); see also id. § 22.1, at 763–64 (“As a general rule an illegal 
bargain is unenforceable and, often void. . . . The Restatement (Second) rejects consideration 
analysis of contracts against public policy. Under its analysis, A’s promise to murder X is 
indeed consideration for B’s promise to pay A $10,000. B’s promise is unenforceable, not 
because of the lack of consideration, but because it is illegal.” (citations omitted)). 
 82. See id. § 8.1, at 259 (“There are certain classes of persons whose contractual 
capacity is limited. Their agreements are either void, or more often, voidable. These classes 
include infants and persons suffering from mental infirmity.”). 
 83. See id. § 9.1, at 285–86 (“Even though parties who have contractual capacity 
have expressed mutual assent and their agreement is supported by consideration or one of its 
equivalents, the agreement may be void, voidable, or reformable because it is contaminated 
by duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake, or unconscionability. . . . Today the 
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Deborah for her silence to hide sexual misconduct, many states would consider that 
agreement to be void for violating public policy.84 And if Deborah fraudulently 
induced David to agree to the transaction, the agreement could be judicially 
undone.85 
In the case of smart contracts, however, all of these fact patterns could not 
accommodate judicial remediation. Once committed to the blockchain, a smart 
contract will execute after the triggering conditions in its executable code are 
satisfied.86 There are two relevant categories of triggering conditions here: (1) 
conditions which do not depend on an outside Oracle; and (2) conditions which do 
depend on information from an outside Oracle. The vast majority of smart-contract-
based agreements currently contemplated by modern dApps are of the latter 
variety.87 
Smart contracts that have triggering conditions for settlement that do not 
depend on an outside Oracle are the most straightforward example of the failure of 
existing technologies to implement the requirements of common law contract 
doctrine. Consider, for example, a simple escrow agreement implemented via an 
Ethereum smart contract. Under the terms of this hypothetical agreement (“A1”), 
David would place 1 BTC88 in escrow pending completion of a separate agreement 
(“A2”) between Deborah and David such as a real estate agreement. In the event 
that A2 is finalized, executed, and committed to the Ethereum blockchain, the 
executable code of A1 would recognize some predetermined aspect of the code of 
A2 and trigger the release of funds from escrow to Deborah. However, if A2 is not 
finalized, executed, and committed to the blockchain by the time agreed to in A1, 
that bitcoin would be returned back to David. There are no other possibilities.89 
 
general rule is that any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party 
constitutes duress.” (citations omitted)). 
 84. See id. § 22.1, at 762 (“Public policy has been the announced rationale for 
striking down contracts or contract clauses on the grounds of immorality, lobbying, 
unconscionability, stock redemption, economic policy, unprofessional conduct, obstruction 
of justice, paternalism, ultra vires, defrauding of creditors, parental deals that prejudice their 
children’s rights to support, and diverse other criteria.”). 
 85. See id. § 9.22, at 323 (“In the great majority of cases, actional 
misrepresentation renders a transaction voidable rather than void. These are cases of fraud in 
the inducement.” (citations omitted)). 
 86. Strictly speaking, there are conditions which might cause execution to fail. 
However, generally speaking, none of these conditions are within the control of a legal 
authority like a court (rather, they generally involve wide-spread system failures or similar 
corner cases). 
 87. Les Wilkinson & Curtis Capeling, How to Understand Blockchain, ASS’N 
CORP. COUNSEL DOCKET, Sept. 2018, at 66, 69 (“Very often, smart contracts use ‘oracles’ to 
provide off-chain information (such as proof of payment or performance, or data from devices 
in the Internet of Things) necessary to the execution of a smart contract.”). 
 88. This is approximately $11,900 USD as of August 18, 2020 according to 
Coinbase. COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/price (last visited Aug. 18, 2020). 
 89. It is important to note, of course, that contracts could be coded in other ways, 
but generally speaking, cryptocurrency smart contracts currently are limited essentially to two 
outcomes: transfer settlement or transfer reversal. 
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What if, however, it turns out that in the process of creating A2, Deborah 
attempted to coerce David by holding a gun to his head and demanding favorable 
terms? Not only would A2 be irreversible once committed to the blockchain, but A1 
would also be triggered and settle. A court would have no ability to intervene. 
If the execution depends on information supplied by an outside Oracle, it 
is possible (although certainly not guaranteed) that a court might be able to 
intervene. Such intervention would depend, however, on the court’s power to affect 
the information supplied by that Oracle before the relevant time expires and would 
also depend on whether the terms of the contract provide for an appropriate judicial 
remedy. The court’s redress options may depend on, but are not limited as a matter 
of law to, the terms of the contract. For example, a contract may not specify 
liquidated or other financial damages, but a court nonetheless may order them. 
Conversely, a court may find a liquidated damages provision unenforceable because 
it is unreasonable, the product of unequal bargaining power, or coercive action by a 
party. In that case, a court might order money damages in an amount different than 
that specified in the contract, or (less commonly) a court might award different 
forms of damages. 
Much of our analysis might suggest the conclusion that current 
implementations of smart contracts are not contracts as a matter of legal doctrine. 
While some commentators have taken doctrinal positions on this matter, including 
that future implementations cannot resolve these shortcomings,90 we argue that the 
doctrinal question is better left for another day when the underlying technology is 
more mature, and its inherent capabilities and limitations are better understood. 
However, this does not mean that the limitations of current smart contract 
technology are trivial. Quite the contrary, as discussed in Part II, those limitations 
are distinct from traditional written contracts with several critical differences and 
important implications for parties to consider when deciding whether or not a smart 
contract is appropriate to govern their agreement. 
C. The Benefits of Bot Contracts 
Common law contract remedies developed to inspire trust in transactions 
between people who did not know each other.91 If one party broke a contractual 
promise, the other can trust that a court might intervene. Of course, the ability to 
 
 90. See Schuster, supra note 70. 
 91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 
1981) (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the 
promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from 
breach.”); see also G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of 
Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 222–23 
(1991) (“The law of contract helps to diminish the danger of opportunism by providing 
assurance to those performing first that their contracting partners can be held accountable if 
they renege. Accountability reduces the risk of entering business transactions and facilitates 
an atmosphere of confidence conducive to exchange.”); id. at 225 (“To sustain trust and 
enhance the chances for reciprocity, parties also must be willing and able to deter those who 
might act opportunistically after a trusting relationship is underway. . . . [T]here is a need to 
devise mechanisms that deter people who are tempted to violate trust. Legal recourse for 
victims of opportunistic conduct is one possible remedy for bolstering the cooperative 
process.”). 
2020] BOT CONTRACTS 899 
obtain relief based on breach or void an unlawful deal is contingent on being able to 
hire a lawyer.92 And there is a substantial literature on how access to counsel and 
courts is a luxury to which many do not have access.93 The transactions known as 
smart contracts avoid the need to put trust in another party or the judicial system. 
Software is designed to ensure performance. Resources are not needed to ensure 
accountability or performance. The technology performs the obligations 
automatically, taking the uncertainty of human performance accountability out of 
the equation. The technology alleviates the need to trust any particular person to 
ensure contract settlement once the terms have been satisfied. It is an ideal solution 
for two parties who both want to unlock a car or conduct a transaction with the 
understanding that the transaction will be fixed. Importantly, these technologies do 
not remove all ambiguity or obviate all need for trust.94 One must still place trust in 
the technology and the community’s attributions of meaning attached to various 
terms in the code.95 In short, current smart contracts are ideal for circumstances 
where automatic self-settlement of contracts is desired, where the terms and 
outcomes of the contract are readily predictable in advance, where customary market 
terms will likely govern transactions, and where the parties are comfortable waiving 
traditional rights and defenses associated with common law contracts, such as 
duress, fraud, and incapacity. 
D. Future Developments 
It is important to recognize that computing and information technology 
constantly evolves. With the exception of certain subsets of theoretical modeling,96 
“truth” and “proof” about the “state of technology” are subject to a very large 
qualification given the state of technology at the time the assertion is made. 
Recognizing this critical distinction, which is similar to the qualification “under 
current law,” this Section identifies some of the assumptions upon which this Article 
rests and examines probable future technological developments which may impact 
its conclusions. 
First, we begin with the assumptions on which this Article relies. We 
describe the state of commonly used blockchain technologies as of approximately 
 
 92. See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (“Litigants who remain unrepresented are less likely to obtain 
a fair outcome in court.”). 
 93. See generally, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor 
People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741 (2015); Dina E. Fein, Access to Justice: A Call for 
Progress, 39 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 211 (2017); Columbia L. Sch. Hum. Rts. Clinic, Access 
to Justice: Ensuring Meaningful Access to Counsel in Civil Cases, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 409 
(2014). 
 94. See Grimmelman, supra note 63, at 20. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Generally, these are not relevant to this discussion. But even to the extent some 
exceptions are, those are subject to the general qualifications of mathematics and physics—
i.e., “that we are performing base-10 arithmetic,” “that we are operating in an environment 
like that on the surface of the Earth,” and in the extreme, “that we are operating in a place in 
the Universe where traditional principles of Newtonian physics apply.” These examples serve 
only to illustrate that certain assumptions always apply, which is indeed the point to which 
this Section is responsive. 
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early 2019. We focus on technology currently in widespread use for business and 
other organizational applications. These qualifications generally describe the 
technologies with which much blockchain-related legal scholarship engages,97 and 
thus, we follow in that tradition with only the minor modifications suggested in Part 
II. 
We recognize that many of our conclusions may be altered, possibly 
significantly, as the state of the technology changes. This Article interrogates the 
degree to which contract law’s promises are fulfilled by current blockchain 
technologies due to the technology’s inability to act according to the common 
understanding of its name. We encourage future authors to apply it to new and 
developing technologies. We do not claim that smart contracts will never be able to 
act like common law contracts. Such a claim would be rank hubris. Rather, we claim 
that they currently fail to do so and note the following potential future developments 
which may impact that analysis. 
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the current state of smart contract 
technology is its inherent (generally) irrevocable self-executing nature.98 Early 
versions of such technology, most notably early iterations of Ethereum, did not 
construct their governance structures enabling anything other than self-executing 
smart contracts. The Turing-complete nature of Ethereum technically could insert a 
third-party arbiter at a specific, predefined time prior to final resolution (in the form 
of an Oracle). However, such an intervention would be limited to predefined time(s), 
which limits the ability of the system to provide remedies at all the times such 
remedies would be available under common law contracts. Additionally, such an 
intervention protocol would necessitate an affirmative response from the arbiter or 
a “timeout” period,99 either of which would impose nontrivial transaction costs at 
least in the form of delay. 
There is nothing inherent in the science of DVTs, however, preventing the 
implementation of a third-party neutral arbiter into the smart contract resolution 
process. Consider, for example, a modification of the Ethereum platform whereby 
smart contract resolution resulted in the transfer of a certain amount of currency, but 
where that currency was “subject to recall” for a specific period. If a contract defense 
were raised during that period, the funds could be “recalled” by a designated arbiter 
into escrow pending the outcome of appropriate judicial or other legal resolution.100 
 
 97. See generally, e.g., KROLL ET AL., supra note 20; Turpin, supra note 38; 
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 31; Schuster, supra note 71 (Although Schuster does attempt 
to look forward at developments, we feel his analysis is incomplete.). 
 98. Technically, irrevocability depends on the inability of anyone (or even a few) 
parties to control the consensus mechanism. As a practical matter—and as discussed in Part 
II—it is not realistic that any such attacks would be implemented against a given contract. 
See also supra note 16. 
 99. A period during which the transaction was essentially “frozen,” after 
satisfaction of performance but before settlement of funds, during which dispute resolution 
could occur. 
 100. Such an approach is critically distinct from attempting to implement such 
mechanisms within each current smart contract because common law contract doctrine 
requires those defenses always be available, i.e., one can’t “contract around them.” 
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It is quite plausible for such a feature to be implemented into future smart contract 
platforms. 
A related but distinct technological advance that could alter our analysis 
would be the implementation of a method for interactive contract enforcement and 
adjudication. Such an implementation is far closer to the current state of the 
technology, and indeed, some blockchain industry projects have been working 
toward such a concept.101 Interactive enforcement and adjudication is related to the 
creation of third-parties capable of interrupting execution to enforce defenses. 
Indeed, one (albeit incomplete) method of implementing “execution interrupts” is 
through interactive enforcement and adjudication. However, it is important to 
distinguish between these concepts, as even interactive adjudication and 
enforcement based on execution “interruption” depends on predetermined scripted 
conditions lacking the independent, human-driven qualitative judgment associated 
with traditional judicial fora. 
Interactive adjudication and enforcement, usually at a specified point in 
contract execution, allows for external input including an interactive process to 
determine whether or not a smart contract should resolve. This can partially 
implement “execution interrupts” but can only do so at a prespecified time and under 
prespecified terms.102 By contrast, implementing “execution interrupts” does not 
create a process for qualitative evaluation of whether a contract should resolve, so 
much as creating a procedure to interrupt or reverse resolution in the event a certain 
type of event, i.e., a contract defense, has occurred. 
The importance of interactive adjudication and enforcement becomes clear 
in the context of contracts whose fulfillment depends on the evaluation of some 
qualitative term, such as artistic or creative satisfaction. Determination of such 
fulfillment depends on qualitative analysis currently outside the capabilities of smart 
contract platforms, except through the use of input from Oracles. And indeed, some 
smart contracts currently use Oracles for this purpose. Oracles standing alone, 
however, are incomplete because they do not embed the type of deliberative process 
guaranteed by judicial resolution of common law contracts. Even binding arbitration 
clauses in common law contracts may result in a process allowing each party to 
proffer facts, argue their position, and respond to arguments and evidence submitted 
by the opposition.103 Current smart contract platforms do not implement these 
 
Implementing such things in each individual smart contract places them under the control of 
the contracting parties, which is inconsistent with the requirements of common law contracts. 
By contrast, implementing such third-party resolution provisions through the system not only 
would apply them to all parties, but critically would take such decisions out of the hands of 
the contracting parties, consistent with the requirements of common law contract doctrine. 
 101. See, e.g., Overview, OPENLAW, https://docs.openlaw.io/ (last visited Sept. 22, 
2020). 
 102. And thus, it does not implement all the contract law defenses discussed supra 
Section III.B. 
 103. See, e.g., Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 614 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that an arbitration clause binding only one party was unenforceable for lack of mutual 
consideration). 
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abilities. However, there is nothing scientifically preventing them from doing so in 
the future.104 
CONCLUSION 
Current smart contract technology simply cannot implement all the aspects 
of legal contracts under common law doctrine. We do not mean to say that 
technological development cannot achieve those aspects in the future. It is too early 
for such determinations to be made. Likewise, none of the points are intended to 
indicate that we do not find smart contract transactions to be of considerable value. 
Three great values of these transactions are that they remove risk, reduce 
uncertainty, and eliminate the need for court intervention. However, these 
transactions are not contracts in the common law sense of the term. And they are not 
smart. Once set into motion, they will execute once the triggering conditions are 
satisfied. For all of these reasons, they are better conceived as automated rather than 




 104. It is worth noting that such processes may impose high transaction costs and 
obviate many of the economic benefits of smart contract-style agreements over traditional 
common law contracts. It is also worth noting that some scholars have argued that these 
problems cannot be overcome. See Schuster, supra note 71, at 26–29. Such arguments 
generally fail, however, because they assume certain static aspects of the system, and such 
assumptions are provably untrue. Oracles, for example, are not (as Schuster claims) forced to 
a binary choice of either conveying information automatically or becoming central authorities 
which mediate the application of judicial judgments. Id. at 27. In one simple counterexample, 
code could be developed in a smart contract to take external input and determine whether or 
not to release code from escrow during a “hold” period. Or, alternatively, code could include 
reversibility functions which last for the durations of the applicable statute of limitations. The 
fact that a recipient spends the money and thus may make themselves lack the means to 
reverse the transaction is no different than a defendant in a contract case who makes 
themselves “judgment-proof” in the traditional common law sense. 
